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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Preston A Joy appeals from his convictions for felony domestic violence and
second degree kidnapping.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
At 1:40 a.m. on July 29, 2009, Deputy Ellis was dispatched to the Joys' residence
in Hauser, Idaho, to investigate a domestic disturbance. (Tr. 1, p.419, Ls.13-25.) Earlier
that evening, during a heated argument, Joy brutally beat his wife, Jennifer, pushing her
into a tub of freezing cold water as he hit her alternatively with the palm and back of his
hand, punched her, stripped off her clothes, pulled her hair and dunked her head under
the water. (Tr., p.280, L.22 - p.284, L.6; p.285, Ls.14-23.) Ignoring her pleas to stop,
Joy gagged Jennifer with a hand towel. (Tr., p.284, L.9 - p.285, L.5.) Joy briefly left
Jennifer as the water drained from the tub, only to return with a bootlace which he used
to bind her wrists and left ankle behind her back.

(Tr., p.285, L.24 - p.286, L.25.)

Jennifer alleged that Joy then sodomized her with a purple dildo.

(Tr., p.287, L.7 -

p.288, L.3.)
Joy then led Jennifer, still bound and naked except for a robe over her shoulders,
to his pickup truck. (Tr., p.288, L.8 - p.289, L.4.) Joy drove Jennifer out to the back of
their secluded property, beating her as they went, and threatening to leave her tied to a
tree to be eaten by the bears and mosquitoes.

(Tr., p.289, L.5 - p.291, L.12.)

Eventually, the violence deescalated, and Joy drove them back home. (Tr., p.291, L.13
Multiple transcripts were prepared for this appeal. Unless otherwise noted, all
citations to "Tr." are to the two-volume "Transcript on Appeal," which includes the jury
trial and all preliminary and post-trial motions.
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- p.292, L.2.)

Feigning sleep, Jennifer waited for Joy to fall asleep, then she went

outside from the other end of the house and called 911. (Tr., p.292, L.16 - p.293, L.18.)
Arriving on the scene contemporaneously with two other officers, Deputy Ellis
contacted Jennifer as she sat outside the front of the house.

(Tr., p.421, Ls.2-12.)

Deputy Ellis observed that Jennifer
had a purplish bruise forming underneath her right eye which was also
swollen. There was also a red mark on the whites of her right eye. On the
- her lips she had a cut on the upper left side and the inside of her mouth
was bloody and her lips were swollen. She additionally had purplish
bruises forming on the insides of both of her upper arms on the left and
the right arm. She had bruises on the forearms of both her left and right
elbows going all the way down to the elbow as well as she had freshly
scraped patches of skin. She had a red mark on her white [sic] shin and
additional patches of scraped skin on her legs as well.

She had a mark around her left ankle which we call [a} ligature mark. It
was a red circle. She also had red circle marks around both of her wrists.
(Tr., p.427, L.5 - p.428, L.1.) After speaking with Joy, Jennifer, and their houseguest,
and verifying Jennifer's account, Deputy Ellis determined that probable cause existed to
take Joy into custody and arrested him. (Tr., p.428, L.15

p.437, L.7.)

The state charged Joy with second degree kidnapping, felony domestic battery,
and sexual penetration with a foreign object.

(R., pp.50-51.) Joy pied not guilty and

went to trial. (R., pp.62-64; Tr., p.11, L.18 - p.12, L.18.) In a pretrial motion in limine,
the state sought approval to admit evidence under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) of
three recent instances of domestic abuse and one instance of sexual abuse, all
committed by Joy against Jennifer during the four months immediately preceding the
charged crime. (R., pp.67-81.) Joy objected to the admission of the 404(b) evidence.

2

(R, pp.82-88.)

After a hearing on the matter (see Tr., pp.21-75), the district court

granted the state's motion (R., p.97).
Also before trial, Joy moved the court for a subpoena duces tecum to force
Jennifer "to release her computer to [Joy's counsel] for investigational purposes,"
alleging that it contained sexually explicit photographs of Jennifer engaging in
consensual anal penetration and sexual bondage, and was therefore relevant to
impeach her testimony regarding the forced sexual penetration. (R., p.101; Tr., p.91,
L.6 - p.92, L.9.)

The state moved the court to quash the subpoena under Idaho

Criminal Rule 17 and because Joy had failed to comply with Idaho Rule of Evidence
412. (R., p.103; Tr., p.81, Ls.11-24; p.82, L.18-p.83, L.11.) After a hearing (see Tr.,
pp.81-96), the district court quashed the subpoena for the computer solely on the
grounds that Joy had not complied with Rule 412 (R., p.122; Tr., p.94, Ls.2-21).
Joy later brought a motion to reconsider, complying with Rule 412 (R., pp.14450), and the district court held another hearing (see Tr., pp.109-27). At the close of the
hearing, the district court found that Joy had complied with Rule 412, but that the
photographs were not relevant to the case. (Tr., p.122, L.17 - p.123, L.3.) The court
recognized that the images could become relevant for rebuttal purposes, however, and
admonished the state to keep the computer available. (Tr., p.123, Ls.3-7.) Later, it was
revealed that Jennifer had deleted the images from her computer. (Tr., p.129, L.20 p.130, L.4.) The district court ordered that the computer be immediately surrendered to
the sheriff's office for forensic experts to try to recover and secure the deleted images,
or if they could not, for the computer to be surrendered to Joy to recover the images.
(R., p.171; Tr., p.135, L.17 - p.136, L.7.) Forensic experts recovered images showing

3

consensual anal penetration, but no images involving sexual bondage. (See Tr., p.141,
Ls.9-13.)
The case proceeded to trial. Joy requested that the district court instruct the jury
on false imprisonment as a lesser included offense to the second degree kidnapping
charge, and domestic battery (without traumatic injury) as a lesser included offense to
the felony domestic violence charge.

(R., pp.135-40.)

Near the close of trial, Joy

moved the court to accept the lesser included offense instructions. (Tr., p.540, Ls.1821.) The district court, finding that the evidence presented at trial did not warrant the
instructions, denied the motion. (Tr., p.656, Ls.8-23.)
Ultimately, the jury hung on the kidnapping charge, returned a guilty verdict on
felony domestic violence, and acquitted on the charge of sexual penetration with a
foreign object. (Tr .. p.742, Ls.1-19; see also R., p.279.) The district court declared a
mistrial on the kidnapping charge (R., p.281) and re-set for a new trial on that count (R.,
p.284).

Pending the second trial on the charge of second degree kidnapping, the

parties entered a binding Rule 11 plea agreement, pursuant to which Joy entered an
Alford 2 plea to the kidnapping charge and specifically reserved the right to appeal the
court's pre-trial, trial, and post-trial rulings. (R., pp.318-21.) The district court accepted
the binding agreement and Joy's plea. (R., pp.330-31.)
The district court entered a judgment of conviction and imposed a unified
sentence of fifteen years with ten years fixed on Joy's kidnapping conviction, and a
concurrent sentence of ten years fixed on his domestic violence conviction. (R., pp.35153.) Joy filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.355-58.)

2

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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ISSUES
Joy states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the district court err in allowing the State to present extensive
evidence of alleged "prior bad acts" at Mr. Joy's trial?
2.
Did the district court err in preventing Mr. Joy from obtaining
discovery of certain exculpatory evidence?
3.
Did the district court err in a number of its mid-trial evidentiary
rulings?
4.
Did the district court err in refusing to instruct the jury on certain
lesser included offenses?
5.
Did the accumulation of errors in this case deprive Mr. Joy of a fair
trial?
(Appellant's brief, p.10.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Joy failed to establish error in the district court's determination to permit the
presentation of 404(b) evidence?
2.
Joy was ultimately acquitted of forcible sexual penetration with a foreign object.
Is Joy's claim that the district court erred in quashing a subpoena for evidence, which he
argued would aid his defense against the charge of forcible sexual penetration with a
foreign object, therefore moot?
3.

Has Joy failed to establish reversible error in the district court's midtrial rulings?

4.
Has Joy failed to establish that the district court erred by declining to instruct the
jury on lesser included offenses that were not supported by the evidence?
5.
Joy has failed to establish error on appeal. Has he therefore failed to show that
the cumulative error doctrine applies in this case?

5

ARGUMENT

I.
Joy Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination To Admit Evidence
Of Recent Abuse Committed By Joy Against His Wife Under Rule 404(b)

A.

Introduction
Joy argues that the district court erred in admitting, under Idaho Rule of Evidence

404(b), evidence of three prior instances of physical abuse and one of sexual abuse, all
of which Joy committed against his wife, Jennifer, during the four months immediately
preceding the charged conduct.

(Appellant's brief, pp.10-31.) Application of relevant

legal authority to the record shows no error by the district court in its determination that
the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b). Joy has failed to establish error in the
district court's relevancy determination or an abuse of discretion in its weighing of that
relevancy against the risk of unfair prejudice. The district court's ruling should therefore
be affirmed.

B.

Standard Of Review
Rulings under Rule 404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard: whether the

evidence is admissible for a purpose other than propensity is given free review, while
the determination of whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Grist, 147 ldaho49, 51, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009).

6

C.

The District Court Correctly Admitted Evidence Of Prior Domestic Abuse Under
Rule 404(b)
In a pretrial motion in limine, the state sought a ruling allowing it to admit at trial

evidence of three recent instances of domestic abuse, all committed by Joy against his
wife, Jennifer, during the four months immediately preceding the charged crime, under
Rule 404(b). (R., pp.67-81.) After a hearing on the motion, the district court ruled that
the three prior instances of domestic abuse would be admissible at trial. (Tr., p.66, L.8
- p.74, L.8.) Joy has failed to show error in the district court's ruling.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is inadmissible to prove the character
of the defendant in an attempt to show that he committed the crime for which he stands
trial. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188. However, such evidence is admissible
for other purposes, including proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. I.RE. 404(b); see also State v.
Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 845 P.2d 1211 (1993); State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 87, 785
P.2d 647, 651 (Ct. App. 1989).

Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible if (a) it is

relevant to prove some issue other than the defendant's character, and (b) its probative
value for the proper purpose is not substantially outweighed by the probability of unfair
prejudice. State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d 227, 230 (1999). The second
prong of this test only excludes evidence if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially
outweighs its probative value. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 275-76, 77 P.3d 956,
964-65 (2003).
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1.

Evidence That Joy Had Recently Domestically Abused His Wife Was
Relevant To Show Joy's Common Scheme Or Plan, Intent, And An
Absence of Accident In Abusing His Wife

The district court determined that the genera! context of the relationship between
Joy and his wife, as evidenced by episodes of recent domestic abuse, was admissible
at trial to show Joy's common scheme or plan in abusing his wife. (Tr., p.69, L.2 - p.71,
L.1; p.73, L.3 - p.74, L.2.)

To be admissible under Rule 404(b), evidence must be

relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged.

State v.

Canelo, 126 Idaho 386, 393, 924 P.2d 1230, 1237 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing State v. Tapia,
127 Idaho 249, 254, 899 P.2d 959, 964 (1995)). As held by the Idaho Supreme Court in
Grist: "Where relevant to the credibility of the parties, evidence of a common criminal
design is admissible." Grist, 147 Idaho at 54, 205 P.3d at 1190 (quoting State v. Moore,
120 Idaho 743, 746, 819 P.2d 1143, 1146 (1991)). In this case, the 404(b) evidence
was also relevant to show Joy's intent to abuse his wife, and an absence of accident in
the injuries that Jennifer sustained. 3
At trial, the issues in dispute were determining agency and who was the initial
aggressor. Joy's wife, Jennifer, testified that Joy savagely beat her. (Tr., p.280, L.16 p.291, L.3.) Under Joy's theory of the case, however, his wife was drunk and caused
her own injuries by tripping over chairs and twice stumbling down an embankment at
their property (see Tr., p.528, Ls.8-20; p.545, L.9 - p.546, L.12), or she was the initial
aggressor, and Joy was merely acting in self-defense (see Tr., p.517, L.12 - p.519, L.8;
3

Below, the state argued that evidence of the recent episodes of abuse was relevant
for a number of purposes, including showing Joy's intent and that Jennifer's injuries
were not the result of an accident. (R., pp.73-74.) Although the district court did not
specifically find that this evidence was relevant on these bases, relevancy is reviewed
de nova and this Court can affirm on these alternative bases. State v. Pullin, 152 Idaho
82,
266 P.3d 1187, 1192 (Ct. App. 2011).
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p.523, L.18

p.525, L.19), or some combination of the two.

The nature of the

relationship between Joy and his wife, as shown through the recent acts of abuse
committed by Joy against his wife, was relevant to helping the jury decide who the initial
aggressor was, whether Joy intended to abuse his wife or merely acted in self-defense,
whether Jennifer accidently caused her own injuries by "falling down," as Joy claimed,
and understanding Joy's common criminal design in abusing his wife. Because it was
relevant to permissible purposes, the 404(b) evidence was properly admitted.
Whenever there is an ongoing relationship between a victim and a defendant, the
nature of that relationship will likely be relevant to determining what occurred in a
particular case, as it is here.

"Domestic violence is never a single isolated incident.

Rather, domestic violence is a pattern of behavior, with each episode connected to the
others." Jane H. Aiken & Jane C. Murphy, Evidence Issues in Domestic Violence Civil
Cases, 34 Fam. L. Q. 43, 56 (2000) (cited to the district court, R., p.67).
In abusive relationships between the same defendant and victim, the Idaho Court
of Appeals has recognized that "testimony about when and how the abusive behavior
began allow[s] the jury to see the full picture, putting [the victim's] testimony about the
charged acts in context." State v. Scovell, 136 Idaho 587, 590, 38 P.3d 625, 629 (Ct.
App. 2001 ). Likewise, in the context of domestic violence cases, the Vermont Supreme
Court has held that prior incidents of abuse involving the same victim and the same
defendant are admissible under Rule 404(b), explaining:
Here, we need not decide whether the prior bad acts may be
admissible solely to show fear or intent because the evidence was
relevant. also to portray the history surrounding the abusive relationship,
providing the needed context for the behavior in issue. The purpose of
establishing defendant's history of abusing the victim is not to show his
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general character for such abuse, but to provide the jury with an
understanding of defendant's actions on the date in question.
Allegations of a single act of domestic violence, taken out of its
situational context, are likely to seem incongruous and incredible to a jury.
Without knowing the history of the relationship between the defendant and
the victim, jurors may not believe the victim was actually abused, since
domestic violence is learned, controlling behavior aimed at gaining
another's compliance through multiple incidents.
State v. Sanders, 716 A.2d 11, 13 (Vt. 1996) (citations and quotations omitted).
On appeal, Joy asserts that Sanders creates a special evidentiary standard for
domestic violence cases. (See Appellant's brief, p.17, n.17.) It does not The nature of
the victim's and defendant's relationship will likely be relevant in cases of domestic
violence because an ongoing, intimate relationship between victim and defendant is
required for the charge of domestic violence. See l.C. § 18-918(1 )(a); State v. Schulz,
151 Idaho 863, _ , 264 P.3d 970, 974 (2011 ).

That does not mean that a

relationship's context is only relevant in cases dealing with domestic violence.
~.

See,

Scovell, 136 Idaho 587, 38 P.3d 625 (a case involving sexual abuse). Rather, the

relevance of any particular evidence necessarily depends on the facts of the case. In
this case, where the defense argued that the victim was the initial aggressor and/or
caused her own injuries, the history and pattern of abusive behavior were absolutely
relevant to determining material and disputed issues in the case.
Indeed, one means of establishing a common scheme or plan long recognized by
Idaho appellate courts is to show the similarities between the charged crime and the
prior conduce such as the same victim, similar acts, and their closeness in time. See
Grist, 147 Idaho at 54-55, 205 P.3d at 1190-91 (evidence of prior bad acts is admissible
to show common scheme or plan where the crimes are so related to each other that
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proof of one tends to establish the other) (citing State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 75051, 810 P.2d 680, 688-89 (1991)); see also State v. Lewis, 123 Idaho 336, 350-51, 848
P.2d 394, 408-09 (1993) (admitting evidence of prior sexual abuse between the
defendant and the same victim as common scheme or plan); State v. Hansen, 127
Idaho 675, 680, 904 P.2d 945, 950 (Ct. App. 1995) (admitting evidence of prior sexual
abuse as common scheme or plan where allegations "involved the same victim and
similar acts committed within a relatively brief span of time").

Unsurprisingly, cases

involving the same defendant and the same victim embroiled in the same, ongoing
violent domestic relationship are likely to have many similarities between the charged
crime and other recent outbursts of violence between the defendant and victim.
Contrary to Joy's assertions on appeal, the three prior incidents of domestic
abuse were markedly similar to the charged domestic violence.

Not only did they

involve the same victim and all occur over the brief span of four months preceding the
charged conduct, but the conduct itself followed the same design: In the evening, after
consuming alcohol, Joy and his wife argue, the argument turns physical, Joy restrains
his wife and inflicts injuries, tossing her around and hitting her with both the palm and
the back of his hand, the incident calms down and Joy claims that his wife merely "fell
down." (Compare Tr., p.31, L.2 - p.37, L.2; p.43, L.24 - p.44, L.3; p.46, Ls.20-23; p.49,
Ls.2-24 and R., pp.76-78 with R., pp.17-20.) The only significant difference between
the prior incidents and the charged crime was the increasing degree of violence.
Recognizing all of these similarities, the district court correctly determined that the
relationship's context, as established by the evidence of recent domestic violence, was
relevant to show Joy's common scheme or plan.
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On appeal, Joy argues that common scheme or plan cannot apply to his violent
outbursts of domestic abuse because the state failed to show that the outbursts were
premeditated.

(Appellant's brief, pp.20-22.)

There is no requirement to establish

premeditation in order to show a common scheme or plan. Rather, as explained by the
Idaho Supreme Court in Grist, "common scheme or plan" is simply a legal rubric which
includes several admissible purposes of 404(b) evidence, such as preparation, plan,
knowledge, and identity.

Grist, 147 Idaho at 54, 205 P.3d at 1190.

And those

elements, together, are established by showing the marked similarities between the
charged crime and the prior conduct, as was done in this case.
Joy also argues that admitting evidence which shows the context of violent
domestic relationships is "wholly unsupportable" because "[t]here is no reason to
believe that domestic violence is beyond the ken of the average juror." (Appellant's
brief, p.24.) In fact, Joy's assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, the dynamics and
context of domestic violence are outside the ken of the average juror.

See

Massachusetts v. Goetzendanner, 679 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) ("We
conclude, as have courts in other jurisdictions, that the pattern of behavioral and
emotional characteristics common to the victims of battering lies beyond the ken of the
ordinary juror and may properly be the subject of expert testimony.") (citations omitted);
see also State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 855, 26 P.3d 31, 38 (2001 ). Joy has failed to
show error in the district court's determination that the context of his relationship with his
wife, as shown by the episodes of recent domestic abuse, was relevant to show Joy's
common criminal design. Nor has Joy shown that the evidence was irrelevant to show
Joy's intent to abuse his wife, or an absence of accident in the injuries suffered by
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Jennifer, as argued by the state below.

The district court's relevancy determination

should therefore be affirmed.

2.

The District Court Correctly Found That The Evidence's Probative Value
Was Not Substantially Outweighed By A Danger Of Unfair Prejudice

Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if,
in the district court's discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs
the probative value of the evidence. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 720,
722 (201 O); State v. Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868,

264 P.3d 975, 977 (Ct App. 2011 ).

"Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it is damaging to a defendant's
case. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it suggests decision on an improper basis."
Fordyce, 151 Idaho at_, 264 P.3d at 977. "Under [Rule 403], the evidence is only
excluded if the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. The rule suggests a strong preference for admissibility of relevant evidence."
State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 (1990) (emphasis
original).
Absent a clear abuse of discretion in weighing potential prejudice against
relevance, a district court's Rule 403 balancing will not be disturbed on appeal. State v.
Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 406, 807 P.2d 610, 624 (1991 ); State v. Clark, 115 Idaho 1056,
1059, 772 P .2d 263, 266 (Ct. App. 1989). Properly exercising its discretion, the district
court determined that the probative value of evidence of recent domestic abuse was not
substantially outweighed by a risk o'f unfair prejudice, and that any unfair prejudice could
be mitigated by a limiting instruction. (Tr., p.71, L.23 - p.72, L.10.)
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The district court properly instructed the jury that, if believed, they were only to
consider the 404(b) evidence "for the limited purpose of proving the defendant's motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or
accident" and prohibited them from considering it to prove some criminal disposition.
(Tr., p.663, L.23 - p.664, L.11; R, p.269 (Instruction No. 14b).) This Court presumes
that the jury followed the district court's instructions. State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210,
222, 207 P.3d 186, 198 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478, 481, 927 P .2d
451, 454 (Ct App. 1996) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 601, 768 P.2d 1331,
1334 (1989)). Therefore, even if there was the potential for the jury to convict Joy on
the improper basis of propensity, the district court's instruction to the jury, that they were
not to consider the evidence "to prove the defendant's character or that the defendant
had the disposition to commit crimes," minimized that risk of unfair prejudice.
On appeal, Joy argues that the district court's limiting instruction "would have

been meaningless to the jury," especially because "that 'prior bad act evidence,' [sic]
was never specifically identified." (Appellant's brief, pp.29-30.) The limiting instruction,
Instruction No. 14(b), was drafted by the defense and given at Joy's request. (Compare

R., p.142 (Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 6) with R., p.269 (Instruction No.
14(b ).) The district court only modified the defense's instruction by adding all the proper
purposes listed in Rule 404(b). If the district court erred by not specifically identifying
the prior bad acts, that error was invited, and Joy is estopped from challenging the
efficacy of the court's instruction on that basis. See State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176,
_ , 254 P.3d 77, 88 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 402, 3 P.3d 67,

80 (Ct. App. 2000).
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In light of the district court's instructions, evidence of recent incidents of domestic
violence was highly relevant in providing context for the jury to show Joy's common
scheme or plan, intent, and an absence of accident, while bearing a minimal risk of
unfair prejudice, if any at all.

The district court properly exercised its discretion in

determining that the probative value of evidence of recent incidents of domestic abuse
committed by Joy against his wife was not substantially outweighed by a risk of unfair
prejudice.

Joy has failed to establish an abuse of the district court's discretion in

weighing the evidence's probative value against any risk of unfair prejudice. The district
court's ruling admitting the 404(b) evidence should be affirmed.

D.

Evidence Of Prior Sexual Abuse Was Also Admissible Under Rule 404(b)
During the hearing on its motion in limine, the state also introduced evidence of

prior sexual abuse. (Tr., p.28, L.24 - p.31, L.1.) The district court's ruling permitting the
introduction of evidence under Rule 404(b) also encompassed this prior conduct. (R.,
p.97; see also Tr., p.66, L.15 - p.67, L.8; p.74, Ls.7-13.) Joy has failed to establish
error in the district court's ruling.
Joy was charged with forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object under
Idaho Code§ 18-6608. (R., pp.50-51.) To prove forcible sexual penetration, the state
must establish that the penetration was "against the victim's will." l.C. § 18-6608. The
prior conduct, which involved Joy physically restraining his wife and ignoring her
protests while sodomizing her, was relevant to show an absence of mistake on Joy's
part; Le., Joy would have been aware that the charged sexual penetration was not
consensual, because it was not consensual in the prior instance.
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Evidence of the prior sexual penetration also cannot be said to be unfairly
prejudicial. Not only did the district court provide a proper limiting instruction to the jury
regarding the evidence (Tr., p.663, L.23 - p.664, L.11; R., p.269), but Joy was in fact
acquitted of the charged crime (Tr., p.742, Ls.12-14; R., p.279). 4
Joy has failed to establish error in the district court's ruling that the 404(b)
evidence admitted against him was relevant to the charged crimes. Joy has failed to
establish an abuse of the district court's discretion in determining that the evidence's
relevance was not outvveighed by a risk of unfair prejudice. Joy has therefore failed to
establish reversible error and the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.

E.

Harmless Error
Even if the district court erred in admitting the 404(b) evidence, such error would

be harmless. "The standard for determining whether error is harmless is 'whether there
is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the
conviction and that the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt."' State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 477, 488, 873 P.2d 122, 133
(1994) (quoting Pizzuto, 119 Idaho at 762, 810 P.2d at 700).

"An error is harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt if the Court can conclude, based upon the evidence and
argument presented during the trial, that the jury would have reached the same result
absent the error."

State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 471, 163 P.3d 1175, 1183

(2007) (citing State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 71 P.3d 1055 (2003)). See also

4

Ironically, that acquittal was likely the result, in whole or in part, of the admission of
404(b) evidence offered by the defense regarding the victim's voluntary participation in
deviant sexual acts. (See,~. Tr., p.382, Ls.5-10.)
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Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18
(1999)).
The state presented overwhelming evidence establishing Joy's guilt on the
charge of domestic violence.

Testimony related by Mrs. Joy's physician, by Deputy

Ellis, and by Joy confirmed that Jennifer had extensive injuries. (See Tr., p.307, L.13 p.310, L.18; p.427, L.5 - p.428, L.1; p.635, Ls.19-25.) Joy himself admitted that he
caused his wife's black eye. (Tr., p.558, Ls.14-22.) Furthermore, as noted above, the
district court appropriately instructed the jury, limiting the evidence to its relevant
purposes. (Tr., p.663, L.23 - p.664, L.11; R., p.269.) This Court can conclude, based
on the extensive evidence presented during the trial, and the district court's limiting the
404(b) evidence to its proper purposes, that the jury would have reached the same
result absent any error.

11.
Joy's Claim Of Error Regarding The Quashing Of His Subpoena Duces Tecum Is Moot
A.

Introduction
Before trial, Joy moved the district court to order his wife, Jennifer, to surrender

her computer to him so he could remove from its hard drive sexually explicit photos of
her and use them to impeach statements she made to the police regarding the charge
of forcible sexual penetration. (R., p.101; Tr., p.91, L.6 - p.92, L.9.) The district court
quashed Joy's subpoena on the grounds that he had failed to comply with Idaho Rule of
Evidence 412. (R., p.122; Tr., p.94, Ls.2-21.) Ultimately, after Joy later complied with
Rule 412, and it was revealed that Jennifer had deleted the images from the computer,
the district court modified its original order and required Jennifer to surrender the
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computer to the sheriff's office so that forensic experts could attempt to recover and
secure the deleted images in case they became relevant at trial, or to surrender the
computer to Joy to recover the images. (R., p.171; Tr., p.135, L.17 - p.136, L.7.)
On appeal, Joy argues that the district court erred by quashing his subpoena

duces tecum under Rule 412, rather than evaluating the state's motion to quash under
Idaho Criminal Rule 17(b). (Appellant's brief, pp.31-40.) The issue Joy raises is moot
because the jury acquitted on the charge of forcible sexual penetration to which the
images applied. Alternatively, even if the issue is not moot, applying what Joy asserts is
the correct legal standard, the district court ultimately reached the correct result.
Finally, if the district court erred in ordering the sheriff's office to secure the evidence
until it became relevant at trial, such error is harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Justiciability issues, such as mootness, are freely reviewed." State v. Barclay,

149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010) (citing State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 342,
127 P.3d 954, 958 (2005)).

C.

Joy's Argument That The District Court Erred By Not Applying An !.C.R. 17(b)
Analysis Before Quashing The Subpoena Ouces Tecum Is Moot
"A case is moot if it presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial

determination will have no practical effect upon the outcome." In re Doe I, 145 Idaho
337, 340, 179 P.3d 300, 303 (2008) (quoting Goodson v. Nez Perce Bd. of County
Comm'rs, 133 Idaho 851, 853, 993 P.2d 614, 616 (2000)).

The mootness doctrine

precludes review when "the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a
legally cognizable interest in the outcome."
18

Idaho Schools for Equal Educ. Opp. v.

Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 281, 912 P.2d 644, 649 (1996) (quoting
Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429, 432, 816 P.2d 986, 989 (1991)).
Joy asserted below that the sexually explicit photographs would be relevant to
impeach his wife's presumed testimony that she had never consented to being anally
penetrated, helping defend against the charge of forcible penetration. (See R., pp.14650; Tr., p.91, L.6 - p.92, L.9.) Joy was acquitted of the charge of forcible penetration.

(Tr., p.742, Ls.12-14; R, p.279.) This Court is not able to grant a greater remedy than
outright acquittal. Joy's claim of error is therefore moot.
On appeal, Joy attempts to expand the scope of his argument in favor of the
evidence's admissibility by claiming that images of sexual bondage would explain the
ligature marks and thereby rebut the claim of domestic violence.

(Appellant's brief,

p.32.) Below, however, Joy made clear that the evidence under subpoena, including
"photographic evidence that Mrs. Joy allows herself to be 'tied up' during sexual acts"
was only relevant "on the issue of whether Mrs. Joy consented to this type of sexual act
on the day in question." (R., p.149.) Joy's arguments beyond those raised below are
not preserved for appeal. State v. Voss, 152 Idaho 148, _ , 267 P.3d 735, 737 (Ct.
App. 2011) (citing State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992)).
Furthermore, officers never recovered any photographic evidence of sexual bondage
(Tr., p.141, Ls.5-17), so Joy's claim that this evidence would explain his wife's ligature
marks is unsupported.

The only argument properly preserved for appeal, as noted

above, is moot.
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D.

Even if Joy's Claim Is Not Moot, Application Of The !.C.R. 17(b) Analysis
Supports The District Court's Decision To Modify The Subpoena
"Where the lower court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory ... this

Court will affirm the order on the correct theory." Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 579, 21
P.3d 895, 901 (2001 ); see also McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144,
149 (1999) (if trial court reaches the correct result by erroneous theory, appellate court
will affirm upon the correct theory); State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 931 P.2d 1218
(1997) (affirming denial of motion to dismiss on correct legal theory after finding analysis
applied by district court erroneous). This rule has been applied to uphold a trial court's
evidentiary rulings where the trial court's analysis was based on an incorrect legal
standard but the ruling was nevertheless correct under the applicable legal standard.
State v. White, 102 Idaho 924, 925, 644 P.2d 318, 319 (1982).
As discussed above, the district court ultimately ordered Jennifer to surrender her
computer, the property subject to Joy's subpoena, to the sheriff's office so forensic
experts could recover and secure the photos which Joy sought, so he could present
them at trial if they became relevant. (See Tr., p.133, L.14- p.136, L.7.) This ultimate
order modifies Joy's subpoena duces tecum in that the property was surrendered to
state agents rather than directly to Joy. Under l.C.R. 17(b), "[t]he court on motion may
quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive."
l.C.R. 17(b). Applying this standard, the district court's modified ruling is correct.
Unless the photos became relevant at trial, the only purpose for Joy to possess
them would have been to embarrass or intimidate his victim.

Giving compromising

photos and videos of explicit sexual conduct involving a domestic abuse victim to her
abuser, especially where those photos and videos have not yet been shown to be
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relevant at trial, is by definition oppressive and unreasonable. However, if that evidence
became relevant at trial, it would have been important for Joy to be able to present in
his defense. The district court was therefore ultimately correct to modify the subpoena,
ordering state agents to secure the evidence to make it available to Joy if it became
relevant to his defense, while also protecting Joy's victim from intimidation.
Applying the requested standard to the district court's ultimate ruling, Joy has
failed to show error by the district court.

E.

The District Court's Failure To Apply An l.C.R 17(b) Analysis When Quashing
Joy's Subpoena Ouces Tecum Is Harmless
"Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights

shall be disregarded." l.C.R. 52. Joy asserts that "the district court erred in failing to
engage in the appropriate analysis under l.C.R. 17(b)" when it quashed his subpoena
duces tecum. (Appellant's brief, p.31.) The district court affirmatively disregarded the
Rule 17(b) analysis when it initially quashed Joy's subpoena "based on Rule 412 alone."
(Tr., p.94, Ls.2-21.) Following motions to reconsider, the district court revisited its initial
order twice before trial, modifying the order each time. (See Tr., pp.109-36.) Ultimately,
it ordered the sheriff's office to recover and secure the sexually explicit photos and
videos so they would be available if they became relevant at trial. (See Tr., p.135, L.17
- p.136, L.7.) The district court, however, never revisited the LC.R 17(b) analysis.
"The standard for determining whether error is harmless is 'whether there is a
reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the
conviction and that the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt."' State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 477, 488, 873 P.2d 122, 133
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(1994) (quoting State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 762, 810 P.2d 680, 700 (1991)). "An
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the Court can conclude, based upon the
evidence and argument presented during the trial, that the jury would have reached the
same result absent the error." State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 471, 163 P.3d
1175, 1183 (2007) (citing State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 71 P.3d 1055
(2003)).

See also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United

States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)).
Even assuming error in the district court's failure to apply an l.C.R. 17(b)
analysis, this Court can conclude that the district court's failure to engage in the analysis
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt on three bases: First, the district court secured
the evidence Joy sought, making it available to him at trial if it became relevant, so Joy's
substantive right to present relevant evidence in his defense was not affected by the
court's lack of l.C.R. 17(b) analysis. Second, the evidence itself never became relevant
at trial (see Tr., p.483, Ls.2-10), so the district court's analysis did not affect the ultimate
outcome of the trial.

Third, as noted above, the jury ultimately acquitted Joy of the

charge which he claimed the evidence he sought was relevant to rebut, so the failure to
apply an l.C.R. 17(b) analysis certainly did not contribute to the nonexistent conviction.

111.
Joy Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Committed Reversible Error In Its
Midtrial Evidentiary Rulings

A.

Introduction
Joy asserts that during trial the district court erred in determining the admissibility

of certain out-of-court statements, in the admission of an exhibit, and by allowing certain
lines of inquiry from the prosecution during cross-examination. Application of relevant
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legal standards to the record shows no reversible error. Further, none of Joy's claims of
trial error, even if established, would affect Joy's substantial right to a fair trial and
should therefore be disregarded.

See l.C.R. 52.

The judgment of the district court

should be affirmed.

B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of evidence,

and its judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of that
discretion. State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 521, 81P.3d1230, 1231 (2003).

C.

Admissibility Of Out-Of-Court Statements
At trial, the parties sought to introduce certain out-of-court statements into

evidence. Over defense objection, the district court permitted the victim's statements
from the preliminary hearing and as reported to Detective March, but denied Joy's outof-court statements reported to Deputy Ellis. Application of the correct legal standards
shows no error by the district court in its admissibility determinations.

1.

Preliminary Hearing Transcript

During trial, defense counsel sought to use parts of the victim's preliminary
hearing testimony to impeach her trial testimony.

(Tr., p.397, L.9 - p.400, L.20.) In

redirect, noting that "[c)ounsel asked [the victim] a number of questions about the
preliminary hearing that was held in this matter" (Tr., p.410, L.25 - p.411, L.1), the
prosecutor sought to introduce the victim's related testimony from the preliminary
hearing (Tr., p.411, Ls.3-11). Defense counsel objected. (Tr., p.411, Ls.12-15.) The
prosecutor responded with two separate grounds under which the testimony could be
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elicited: First, that "it's a prior consistent statement under oath," and second, "it should
be allowed at this point, especially since the defense spent some time on crossexamination on this particular hearing."

(Tr., p.411, Ls.17-20.)

The district court

overruled the defense's objection. (Tr., p.411, L.21.)
The two separate grounds offered by the prosecutor in response to the defense's
objections present alternative arguments in favor of admission, either under Idaho Rule
of Evidence 801 (d)(1 )(8), or under Idaho Rule of Evidence 106.

Prior consistent

statements may be offered as substantive evidence under Rule 801 (d)(1 )(B) where:
The declarant testifies at trial or hearing and is subject to crossexamination concerning the statement, and the statement is . . . (B)
consistent with declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or
implied charge against declarant of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive.
l.R.E. 801 (d)(1)(B). Under Rule 106, out-of-court statements may be admitted:
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a
party, an adverse party may require that party at that time to introduce any
other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in
fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it
LR.E. 106. Portions of a transcript that provide context to a witness's testimony are
admissible under this rule. State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82, 86, 774 P.2d 252, 256 (1989).
Application of the Rule 106 standard shows no error by the district court in
admitting the victim's testimony from the preliminary hearing. In cross-examination, the
defense asked questions about the victim's recorded statement from the preliminary
hearing transcript.

(See Tr., p.397, L.9 - p.400, L.20.)

The state then sought to

introduce the victim's related testimony from the preliminary hearing transcript to place
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those answers into their context (Tr., p.411, Ls.10-20), which should in fairness have
been considered contemporaneously with her other statements.
On appeal, Joy challenges the victim's preliminary hearing testimony as being
inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(1 )(B).

(Appellant's brief, pp.40-45.)

The related

portions of Mrs. Joy's preliminary hearing testimony, however, are unquestionably
admissible under Rule 106. Joy does not challenge that alternative basis for admitting
the evidence. Joy has failed to show error in the district court's ultimate admission of
the preliminary hearing testimony.

2.

Mrs. Joy's Out-Of-Court Statements To Detective March

Seeking to impeach Mrs. Joy's testimony, the defense asked Deputy Ellis about
out-of-court statements offered by Mrs. Joy on the night of the arrest. (Tr., p.440, L.25 p.441, L.22.) Later in the trial, the state responded to the attack on Mrs. Joy's credibility
by eliciting out-of-court statements she gave to Detective March regarding the brutal
attack she suffered from her husband.

(Tr., p.455, L.6 - p.461, L.7.) Over defense

counsel's hearsay objection, Detective March was allowed to relate the statements.
(Tr., p.455, Ls.11-22.)

Neither of these statements were admissible as substantive

evidence under Idaho Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(1 ). They were, however, admissible for
the purpose of attacking and supporting Mrs. Joy's credibility.
Out-of-court statements are admissible as substantive evidence only when:
The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to crossexamination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A)
inconsistent with the declarant's testimony and was given under oath and
subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or
in a deposition, or (B) consistent with declarant's testimony and is offered
to rebut an express or implied charge against declarant of recent
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fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a
person made after perceiving the person ...

I.RE. 801(d)(1).
Because Mrs. Joy's out-of-court statements to Deputy Ellis were not given under
oath, they were not admissible as substantive evidence under Rule 801 (d)(1 )(A).
However, the out-of-court statements were admissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence
613(b ), which allows extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statements for the limited
purpose of impeachment.

See l.R.E. 613(b).

Once a witness's credibility has been

attacked in this manner, it may be supported by any admissible evidence. I.RE. 806.
Out-of-court statements are inadmissible hearsay only when offered "to prove the truth
of the matter asserted." l.R.E. 801(c). Detective March's testimony, relating Mrs. Joy's
out-of-court statements, was admissible for the same non-hearsay purpose as the
evidence of the victim's statements offered by the defendant:

To establish her

credibility. See State v. Howell, 137 Idaho 817, 821, 54 P.3d 460, 464 (Ct. App. 2002)
(out-of-court statements may be offered for the non-hearsay purpose of rehabilitating a
witness's credibility) (citing State v. Martinez, 128 Idaho 104, 109, 910 P.2d 776, 781
(Ct. App. 1995)).

Joy has failed to show error in the district court's admission of

Detective March's testimony.

3.

Joy's Out-Of-Court Statement To Deputy Ellis

During redirect examination, Joy's counsel asked him what he told Deputy Ellis
while he was being arrested. (Tr., p.650, Ls.7-8.) The state objected to that hearsay
(Tr., p.650, L.9), and defense counsel responded "it's his own statement.
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It's already

been admitted many times by other people" (Tr., p.650, Ls.11-13). The district court
properly sustained the objection. (Tr., p.650, Ls.15-18.)
Joy's argument on appeal that the out-of-court statement should have come in
under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is not preserved.

Joy's argument below, that "it's his own

statement," is not the same grounds for admission that Joy now raises on appeal. An
objection on one ground does not preserve an objection on separate grounds.
State v. Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868,

See

264 P.3d 975, 978 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v.

Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 880, 11 P.3d 494, 499 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Enyeart, 123
Idaho 452, 454, 849 P.2d 125, 127 (Ct. App. 1993)); see also l.R.E. 103(a)(1)
(objections must state the specific ground of objection). 5
Even if the argument is preserved, it still fails because the district court made the
correct ruling on the merits. In order to be admitted under Rule 801 (d)(1 )(B), the out-ofcourt statement must be a statement of some sort that precedes the alleged fabrication
or motive to lie.

State v. McKinney, 107 Idaho 180, 184-85, 687 P.2d 570, 574-75

(1984). Because Joy's statement to Deputy Ellis did not occur prior to the allegation of
fabrication, it is not proper under Rule 801 (d)(1)(8), and Joy has failed to show error in
the district court's exctusion of the hearsay testimony.

D.

State's Exhibit 46 (A Bootlace)
Over defense counsel's objection, the district court admitted into evidence State's

Exhibit 46, a bootlace that the victim testified was very similar to the one Joy used to

5

At best, "[i]t's his own statement" is an argument in favor of admitting an out-of-court
statement under the admission by party-opponent exception (see l.R.E. 801 (d)(2)(A));
but such is permitted only with a party opponent, not with your own party during redirect,
and is something used to impeach, not to rehabilitate.
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hogtie her, if not the same one. (See Tr., p.469, L.9 - p.470, L.16.) Joy contends that
the district court erred in admitting the exhibiC arguing for the first time on appeal that
the state failed to present a sufficient foundation for admission because, apparently,
Mrs. Joy cannot distinguish between leather and nylon.

(Appellant's brief, pp.48-51.)

Below, however, defense counsel objected to the admission of the exhibit on the
grounds that Mrs. Joy's sister-in-law found the bootlace and claimed to give it directly to
the detective, rather than Mrs. Joy giving it directly to the detective. (Tr., p.469, L.25
p.470, L.13.) Joy's argument is therefore not preserved for appeal. See Fordyce, 151
Idaho at_, 264 P.3d at 978 ("An objection on one ground will not preserve a separate
and different basis for excluding the evidence.") (citations omitted).

Nor can Joy

establish fundamental error entitling him to review of the issue for the first time on
appeal. See State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176,

254 P.3d 77, 83-84 (Ct App. 2011)

(errors in the admission of evidence are not fundamental).
Even if the Court reaches the merits of Joy's argument, he has failed to establish
error in the admission of the exhibit.

Foundation for evidence is governed by Idaho

Rule of Evidence 901, which provides:
The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.
l.R.E. 901 (a).

By way of Illustration, the rule further provides that the foundation

requirements can be met through "[t)estimony of a witness with knowledge that a matter
is what it is claimed to be." l.R.E. 901(b)(1).
Regarding State's Exhibit 46, Detective March testified as follows:
Q. How about 46?
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A. And 46 is the shoelaces or boot laces that she gave to me, also.
Q. What did you do with these items after she gave them to you?

A. I marked on them the date, the report number, who they came
from, J. Joy, and, uh, took them back to Kootenai County Sheriff's
Department where I properly marked, inventoried and put into evidence or
booked into evidence.
Q. And at some point did you take them out of evidence?

A. Yes, I did.
Q. When did you do that?

A. I received these from our evidence officer this morning at your
request and, uh, removed them from the evidence bag, stapled them to
the evidence bag, and put them in a paper bag and brought them into
court.
Q. Are those items, the hair, number 45, and the laces, 46, are they
in the same or substantially the same condition now as they were when
Mrs. Joy gave them to you?

A. Yes.
(Tr., p.462, L.9 - p.463, L.6.) And Mrs. Joy testified as follows:
Q. And then what about Number 46?

A. That's the shoelace or the boot lace that I'm pretty sure it was
exactly like this one. I'm pretty sure that's the one he used. My sister-inlaw found it.
Q. And is that the same one you gave to Detective March?

A. Yes.
Q. Are you exactly sure it's the same one?
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A. I'm not exactly sure if it's the same one, but I know that's the
exact same kind he used.
Q. And do those appear today, 45 and 46, to be in the same

condition or substantially the same condition now as when you gave them
to Detective March?
A. Yes.

(Tr., p.469, Ls.9-22.) The district court, correctly finding that sufficient foundation had
been laid, admitted the exhibit. (Tr., p.470, Ls.14-16.)
The above testimony provided sufficient foundation that the bootlace offered into
evidence was the bootlace Mrs. Joy gave to detective March and "the exact same kind
[Joy] used" when he hogtied Mrs. Joy, if not the very lace. Any difficulty Mrs. Joy may
have experienced as she attempted to distinguish between leather and nylon may
properly factor into the weight the jury chose to give to the evidence, but is frankly
immaterial to the issue of foundation. The district court correctly admitted the exhibit.

E.

The Prosecutor's Lines Of Inquiry
Joy argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecutor

to ask certain questions during cross-examination and requiring Joy to answer those
questions. (Appellant's brief, pp.51-60.) Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 611, the district
court is tasked with exercising
reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses
and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and
presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless
consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue
embarrassment.
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1.R.E. 611 (a).

Joy has failed to show an abuse of discretion by the district court in

permitting the prosecutor's complained-of lines of inquiry.

1.

The Scope Of Cross-Examination

At trial, Joy testified that the cause of difficulties between he and his wife was her
failure to attend alcohol abuse treatment. (Tr., p.521, L.16 - p.522, L.15.) On crossexamination, the state challenged those assertions, asking if it was true that in fact Joy
was the one who was required to attend alcohol abuse treatment and that Joy failed to
attend his scheduled treatment.

(See Tr., p.579, L.1 - p.580, L.8.)

Over defense

counsel's objection, Joy was required to answer the state's interrogation. On appeal,
Joy argues that the court erred by allowing the line of inquiry, contending it was beyond
the scope of direct examination. (Appellant's brief, pp.51-54.) Joy has failed to show
error.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 611 (b) provides that "[c]ross-examination should be
limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the
credibility of the witness." l.R.E. 611(b). Whether it was Joy and not his wife who was
required to attend alcohol abuse treatment are matters that bear directly on Joy's
credibility - whether the jury could trust him to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth. As such, this line of inquiry is appropriate under Rule 611 (b) and Joy has
failed to show error.

2.

Eliciting Inferences During Cross-Examination

During trial, the defense called Joy's son, who testified that girls hit guys without
consequences because they don't leave bruises.
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(Tr., p.499, L.19 - p.500, L.23.)

While cross-examining Joy, the prosecutor asked if Joy had ever given his son cause to
believe that. (Tr., p.597, L.15 - p.599, L.20.) Joy argues that the district court erred by
allowing the prosecutor to ask Joy questions regarding how his son arrived at his
beliefs.

(Appellant's brief, pp.55-58.)

Application of relevant legal standards to the

record shows no error by the district court.
Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 701, lay witnesses are permitted to offer
inferences which are
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a
clear understanding of the testimony of the witness or the determination of
a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge ....
l.R.E. 701. Though awkwardly phrased, the prosecutor's first objected-to question, "Are

those beliefs your son has come by himself independent of you?" (Tr., p.597, Ls.23-24),
does not call for speculation.

Taking the whole exchange in context, the ultimate

purpose of the inquiry was simply to ask if Joy had given his son cause to believe that
girls often hit guys without consequences. (See Tr., p.597, L.15 - p.599, L.20.) The
questions merely solicit an inference from Joy that is rationally based on his own
perceptions and helpful to a clear understanding of the testimony.
Contrary to Joy's assertions on appeal, the prosecution's line of inquiry does not
require Joy to speculate on another witness's beliefs. Joy's son already testified to his
own beliefs (see Tr., p.499, L.19 - p.500, L.23), so they are not a matter of speculation.
The prosecutor simply inquired whether Joy had ever said or done anything that could
have led his son to adopt his stated beliefs. Those are subjects within Joy's personal
knowledge, and therefore appropriate under Idaho Rule of Evidence 602.
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3.

Eliciting Specific Details On Cross-Examination

During cross-examination, while describing the injuries his wife had sustained
from, according to Joy, twice stumbling down an embankment next to their house, Joy
said, "She was filthy dirty, had sticks and leaves in her hair. She looked like hell." (Tr.,
p.635, Ls.20-22.)

The prosecutor later followed-up on this statement by asking Joy,

"And about how many sticks were in her hair?" (Tr., p.637, L.5.) Joy explained that
"[t}here were little pieces of brush in her hair," to which the prosecutor asked,
Q. (By Mr. Verharen) How many little pieces of brush were in your wife's
hair?

A I did not count them.
Q. A lot?
A. Quite a bit.
(Tr., p.637, Ls.8-15.) The prosecutor followed-up Joy's answer that there was "quite a
bit" of little pieces of brush in his wife's hair by asking if "quite a bit" was more than 20 or
more than 12. (Tr., p.637, Ls.18-25.) Intermittently throughout this exchange, defense
counsel objected on the basis of "speculation" and that the questions had been "asked
and answered." (See Tr., p.637, Ls.9-24.) The district court correctly overruled these
objections and permitted the line of inquiry. (Id.)
Contrary to Joy's assertions on appeal that the prosecutor's questions
constituted "badgering" (Appellant's brief, pp.58-60), this was a perfectly reasonable line
of inquiry designed to elicit specific details from a witness in order to test that witness's
veracity and credibility. Joy was not being forced to speculate; he had already testified
that his wife had sticks and little pieces of brush in her hair, and that there were "quite a
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bit" of them, so those things were matters within his personal knowledge.

Asking

whether "quite a bit" in Joy's mind was more than 20 or more than 12 does not call for
speculation; it calls for an estimate, which is permissible under Rule 701. See Smith v.
Praegitzer, 113 Idaho 887, 892, 749 P.2d 1012, 1017 (Ct. App. 1988) (lay witness's
testimony approximating her speed at between 20 and 25 miles per hour admissible
under I. R. E. 701). Joy has failed to show error.

IV.
Joy Has Failed To Establish Error By The District Court In Declining To Instruct The
Jury On Lesser Included Offenses That Were Unsupported By The Evidence
A.

Introduction
At trial, Joy's counsel requested that the jury be instructed on the lesser included

offenses of false imprisonment and domestic battery (no traumatic injury). (Tr., p.540,
Ls.18-21; R., pp.135-40.) The district court found that neither instruction was supported
by the evidence and declined to give them.

(Tr., p.656, Ls.8-23.)

On appeal, Joy

asserts that the district court erred by refusing the instructions. (Appellant's brief, pp.6173.)

Review of the record, however, supports the district court's determination that

neither instruction was supported by the evidence presented at trial. Joy has therefore
failed to show instructional error.

B.

Standard Of Review
VVhether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the

appellate court exercises free review. State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 147, 233 P.3d 71,

78 (2010) (citing State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 372, 64 P.3d 296, 298 (2002)).
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C.

The District Court Properly Declined To Instruct The Jury On Lesser Included
Offenses That Were Not Supported By The Evidence
Under the statutory theory, a crime may be a lesser included offense if its

elements are necessarily included in the greater crime, as the greater crime is defined
by statute. State v. Curtis, 130 Idaho 522, 524, 944 P.2d 119, 121 (1997). Applying the
statutory theory, the state concedes both that false imprisonment is a lesser included
offense of second degree kidnapping, and that domestic battery (no traumatic injury) is
a lesser included offense of felony domestic violence. 6
However, to be entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense, the
requesting party must show that "[t]here is a reasonable view of the evidence presented
in the case that would support a finding that the defendant committed such lesser
included offense but did not commit the greater offense." l.C. § 19-2132(b)(2). Where
the evidence presented at trial does not support such a finding, the district court does
not err by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense.

See State v.

Fodge, 121Idaho192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). Review of the record shows that
the district court correctly determined that the evidence presented at trial did not support
instructions on either lesser included offense. The district court properly rejected the
instructions on lesser included offenses and should be affirmed.

6

The crime of second degree kidnapping is similar in all respects to that of false
imprisonment, except that the kidnapping charge requires an element of intent to
secretly confine or imprison which is absent from false imprisonment. Compare l.C. §
18-4501 (1) with l.C. § 18-2901. Likewise, felony domestic violence is similar in all
respects to misdemeanor domestic battery, except felony domestic violence requires
the infliction of a traumatic injury, which is not included in domestic battery. Compare
l.C. § 18-918(2)(a) with l.C. § 18-918(3)(b).
35

1.

Kidnapping

The only distinct element between second degree kidnapping and false
imprisonment is the intent to secretly confine. Compare l.C. § 18-4501 (1) with 1.C. § 182901. The question for the Court, therefore, is whether there is a reasonable view of
the evidence by which the jury could conclude that Joy meant to confine or imprison his
wife without authority of law, but to do so openly. There is no view of the evidence that
could lead the jury to that conclusion.
Joy contested the kidnapping charge on the element of consent.

Jennifer

testified that Joy hogtied her ankle and wrists, dragged her naked through the dirt,
forced her into the pickup truck, and then drove her half a mile out to a secluded portion
of their property and threatened to leave her tied to a tree. (Tr., p.288, L.4 - p.291,
L.12.) Joy absolutely contradicted his wife's testimony, testifying that his wife jumped
into the truck on her own, and that they merely drove to the other side of the house.
(Tr., 552, L.19 - p.553, L.13.) If the jury credited the testimony of the victim, then Joy
was guilty of kidnapping. If, however, they credited Joy's testimony, then he could not
be convicted of false imprisonment, much less kidnapping.

There was no evidence

presented whereby the jury could conclude that Joy had coerced his wife into the truck
and drove her out to the middle of nowhere, but had intended to do so openly.
Even on appeal, the scenario presented by Joy is less than that required for a
conviction for false imprisonment. (See Appellant's brief, pp.66-67.) Contrary to Joy's
understanding, false imprisonment requires a lack of consent (see LC. § 18-2901),
which is obliterated by a grant of consent.

36

Had the jury concluded that Joy's wife

consented to being with him in the truck, then Joy is not guilty of any crime, even if she
later felt "uncomfortable."
Because there was no reasonable view of the evidence by which the jury could
conclude that Joy meant to unlawfully restrain his wife's personal liberty, but to do so
openly, the district court did not err when it refused to instruct the jury on the lesser
included offense.

2.

Domestic Violence

The distinct element between felony domestic violence and misdemeanor
domestic battery is the infliction of a traumatic injury. Compare l.C. § 18-918(2)(a) with
l.C. § 18-918(3)(b).

The question for the Court, therefore, is whether there is a

reasonable view of the evidence by which the jury could conclude that Joy battered his
wife but did not inflict a traumatic injury.
That Joy's wife suffered traumatic injuries was undisputed in this case.

The

physician who treated Joy's wife noted that she was covered in bruises from her scalp
to her legs, there were abrasions on her wrists and left ankle, and a ligature mark on her
ankle.

(Tr., p.307, L.13 - p.310, L.18.)

Deputy Ellis also testified about Mrs. Joy's

extensive injuries. (See Tr., p.427, L.5 - p.428, L.1.) Photographs taken of Mrs. Joy's
injuries by police both at the hospital and at her home near the time of the assault were
entered as exhibits into evidence. (Tr., p.225, Ls.17-20; p.227, Ls.12-13; p.312, Ls.711.) Joy himself testified, "she looked like hell. She was beat up. She was filthy dirty,
had sticks and leaves in her hair. She looked like hell. Her lip was all bloody and her
face was all swelled up. She looked bad." (Tr., p.635, Ls.19-25.) Joy also admitted
causing his wife's black eye. (Tr., p.558, Ls.14-22.)
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The question at trial was not whether fv1rs. Joy received traumatic injuries, but
how. Tami Wiitala, a witness for the prosecution, testified that when she saw Joy's wife
earlier on July 28 she had no visible injuries. (Tr., p.214, L. 19-p.215, L.19.) After Joy
returned home, he and his wife had an argument that became physical when it went into
the back bedroom. (Tr., p.213, Ls.3-8.) When Ms. Wiitala saw Joy's wife in the early
hours of the following morning, she was crying, in a lot of pain, and covered with
bruises. (Tr., p.222, L.6 - p.232, L.21.) Joy's wife also testified that Joy savagely beat
her. (Tr., p.280, L.16 - p.291, L.3.)
Under Joy's theory of the case, however, his wife was drunk and caused her own
injuries by tripping over chairs and twice stumbling down an embankment at their
property (see Tr., p.528, Ls.8-20; p.545, L.9 - p.546, L.12), or she was the aggressor,
and Joy was merely acting in self-defense 7 (see Tr., p.517, L.12 - p.519, L.8; p.523,
L.18 - p.525, L.19), or some combination of the two. These are affirmative defenses
which, if credited, would require outright acquittal and do not support an instruction on
the lesser included offense.
Again, because there was no reasonable view of the evidence by which the jury
could find that Joy both battered his wife and did not inflict a traumatic injury, the district
court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense. 8

7

Though there was no reasonable view of the evidence to support the lesser included
offense instruction on domestic battery, the district court found that Joy did establish
sufficient evidence to support an instruction on self-defense, and so accepted Joy's
proffered instruction. (Tr., p.534, L.25 - p.535, L.3; see also R., pp.166, 271.)
8

Even had the district court erred by declining Joy's instructions on the lesser included
offenses, such error would necessarily be harmless. See State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho
478, 480-81, 927 P.2d 451, 453-54 (Ct. App. 1996) ("any error in the district court's
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V.
Joy Has Failed To Establish That The Cumulative Error Doctrine Applies To This Case

Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. Martinez,
125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate to application of
the doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 407,
958 P .2d 22, 33 (Ct. App. 1998). Joy has failed to show that any errors occurred at his
trial, and therefore the doctrine is inapplicable to this case. See,

~'

LaBelle v. State,

130 Idaho 115, 121, 937 P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997).
"[T]he Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one."
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986). Even if this Court concludes that
errors occurred during Joy's trial, Joy has still failed to show that any alleged errors
deprived him of his due process right to a fair trial, and only that would require reversal.
State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) (accumulation
of errors still deemed harmless absent prejudice); State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 804,
932 P.2d 907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997).

failure to give the [lesser included offense] instructions is harmless under the 'acquittal
first' requirement of l.C. § 19-2132(c)").
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CONCLUSIO~~

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Joy's convictions and
sentence.

DATED this 19th day of April, 2012.
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